The industrialization of animal agriculture has fundamentally transformed animal health markets while animal health innovations have promoted this industrialization. The subtlety of these interactions shows how little we know about agricultural industrialization. To illustrate, we consider three stylized features of industrialized animal agriculture. These are the closing off of production activities from external effects, emphasis on control, and use of biosecurity measures. We find that animal disease externalities should lead to higher stocking on any given farm, and also to deficient entry into animal production. Eradicating the disease in a region increases both the stocking rate per farm and the number of farms. We show that antibiotics as a control strategy should promote intensity of production and the substitution of capital for labor. Also, in long-run market equilibrium a reduction in the price of a biosecurity input could plausibly reduce both operation scale and per-animal input use, i.e., biosecurity inputs can behave like a Giffen good. External biosecurity inputs provided through public animal disease management policy may promote on-farm biosecurity, rather than crowd it out.
Introduction
Descartes' perspective that animals are machines, and perhaps little more, is a matter of great ethical disquiet in contemporary society (Cottingham 1978) . Sweeping developments in the life sciences since about 1950 have provided technical insights on how to control life and growth in ways that have made the animal-as-machine analogy more real. The moral principles and economic tradeoffs at issue have become more clearly defined, in large part because production sciences and the systems they support demand clear definition of the production environment.
Animal disease confounds control efforts, and also belies the attitude that an animal's technical performance can be abstracted from its environs.
Demand for technical performance in animal protein production is large and growing.
Global meat consumption has increased at about 2.4% per annum over the period owing in equal measure to population growth and growth in per capita consumption, and this pattern is projected to continue through to 2017 (Trostle 2008) . In part as a response to market pressures, the dominant animal production format has changed markedly in developed countries in recent times. The newer format, often referred to as industrial animal agriculture, has also made inroads beyond the developed world (Steinfeld et al. 2010; Li 2009 ). While controversial in many ways, the approach has proved to be remarkably successful in providing animal produce suitable for processing at low market prices (Key, McBride and Mosheim 2008; MacDonald and McBride 2009; Mosheim and Knox Lovell 2009 ).
The general matter of this chapter is how industrial animal agriculture and animal health interact. This is a broad topic where detailed economic scrutiny has been largely absent. As typically considered, industrialization refers to a growing focus on and specialization in defined tasks accompanied by scale expansion, market development and structural realignment. While modern theories of industrial development encompass a wide set of phenomena, technical change remains central (e.g., Galor and Moav 2002) . Although the endogeneity of technical change is a primary concern of this literature, in our case we may assume it to be exogenous. This is because animal agriculture is a comparatively small sector of the global economy. The primary sources of technical change in the sector are likely to have been spillovers from innovations in the much larger human medicine, biotechnology, and manufacturing sectors.
Industrialization in animal agriculture has involved confinement in climate-controlled buildings. So confined, animals expend less energy on foraging, defense against predators and temperature regulation. The opportunity also exists to build physical protections against infectious and other diseases. In short, nature's influences can be at least partly controlled.
Additionally, genetic innovations can seek to modify an animal's make-up so as to optimize production given the physical conditions under which production occurs.
The specific focus of this chapter is to provide a general understanding of how the closing off of animal herds affects production. We will do so by looking at three, among many possible, dimensions to how innovations intended to control infectious animal disease can affect the nature of production. Each dimension is modeled in a separate section. The first dimension we will consider pertains to how disease externalities affect the equilibrium structure of production.
By this we mean the stocking rate and the number of farms in the sector. Surprisingly little in the way of formal analysis has been conducted on the topic, perhaps because the result was deemed obvious. As infectious disease is a public bad, one might expect there to be free riding in the form of excessive stocking per farm. In a rather standard model of commons behavior, we show that this is true. But we also show that there are too few farms in the sector, precisely because there is excessive stocking per farm. We develop the analysis to address how efforts to close off herds to disease exposure should affect sector structure.
The second aspect looked at is the use of control technologies. On any given farm, one way to mitigate the effects of external disease is through sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics.
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Infectious disease and animal density are of course related. High animal density is a feature of confined animal production. Research has found animal density on a farm and/or farm density in a region to be factors in increased disease risk (Mortensen et al. 2002; Rose and Madec 2002; Vandekerchove et al. 2004) . Infectious disease among confined animals can lead to sector-wide losses of up to 70%, as in China's shrimp sector during the early 1990s (p. 178 in Smil 2000).
Although scale expansion had been underway in poultry since the 1930s, the advent of antibiotics and other biosecurity innovations likely propelled the growth of confined agriculture in much of the developed world since World War II (Finlay 2004 ).
The use of antibiotics has come under scrutiny in recent years because of concerns that excess use could increase resistance among animal and human infection agents (Miller, McNamara, and Singer 2006; Graham, Boland and Silbergeld 2007) . A prominent feature of the technology is that it promotes uniformity in animals, since a random disease event is less likely to differentiate animals in growth rate and product quality (Hayes and Jensen 2003) . It is not alone in this trait, as feed uniformity-promoting technologies also promote animal performance uniformity (Ciftci and Ercan 2003; Madsen and Pedersen 2010) .
Uniformity allows producers to avoid penalties for marketing lightweight animals and/or the capital costs of keeping some animals in half empty barns. Increased uniformity should also promote the substitution of capital for labor, especially when wages are high. In addition, slaughter animal uniformity allows processors to better automate packing lines. In short, uniformity-promoting technologies increase process control and so might be viewed as a factor contributing to an industrial approach. We provide a brief model to argue that the presence of antibiotics should increase scale of production, and also that antibiotics should lead to an increase in the capital-to-labor ratio.
The third dimension surrounds incentives to guard against infectious disease risk and how these incentives interact with scale of production. Once it enters a large feeding operation, disease can spread rapidly throughout the operation. Scale, biosecurity and other forms of process control tend to go hand in hand. For example, World Bank (2006) and Beach, Poulos and Pattanayak (2007) accept the Dolberg, GuerneBleich and McLeod (2005) classification of four stylized global poultry production systems. In that classification, the biosecurity level increases as production scale increases from backyard format to industrial format.
Subject to engineering constraints, the construction cost of a storage vessel scales up in proportion to the square of the scaling factor (Besanko et al. 2004) . But capacity scales up in proportion to the cube of the scaling factor so that the unit capital cost of storage declines with an increase in scale. Similarly, a feedlot's perimeter length per unit production capacity declines with an increase in production capacity.
2 To the extent that biosecurity regards protecting an enterprise's perimeter, there should be scale economies in doing so.
Our third model provides two counterintuitive results. In light of discussions to this point one may infer that if the unit cost of a biosecurity input declines with an increase in capacity then production capacity and the level of biosecurity should go hand in hand. We show that the inference is not valid. One may also infer that if biosecurity risks originating off-farm are high then there will be an incentive to use biosecurity inputs more intensively on-farm, i.e., internal biosecurity substitutes for external biosecurity. To the contrary, we show that an internal biosecurity input may complement biosecurity inputs external to a farm so that efforts to Disease afflicts the region, with negative animal health spillovers such that output per farm is 3, 4 (1) With decreasing inverse demand function ( ) P Q and fixed cost per farm K , private profit is
The assumptions made to this point on demand and technology are henceforth referred to as the monotonicity assumptions. We posit a two-stage game in which potential entrants make the entry decision simultaneously. Knowing the number of entrants, each entering firm then decides on stocking rate. The information structure is closed loop in that information from the stage 1 entry decision is known to all who make the stage 2 stocking rate decision.
Under simultaneous-move Nash behavior, and given that N is large, the stage 2 problem involves setting n s at level ˆn s solving
F  is the partial derivative with respect to the ith argument, ( ) n c s  is marginal cost and producers have been assumed to take price as given.
it follows that private profit is concave in its own action. Notice too that, for i n  ,
so that the actions are strategic substitutes whenever the cross-derivative of ( ) F  is nonpositive. The sign 12 ( ) 0 F   , which we assume, indicates that the marginal product of own stocking rate becomes less positive whenever other farms in the region stock more. With common firms, the symmetric solution to (3) given N region firms (labeled as ˆN s ) requires
Here ˆN Q is region-wide aggregate output while it is understood that
Given stocking rate ˆN s per firm, social welfare is
Writing farm profit at Nash equilibrium as
the derivative of social welfare with respect to farm number is
Under free entry it follows that ˆ0 N   . Furthermore we may apply Nash optimality condition (3) so that derivative (9) reduces to
So as to avoid technicalities at the expense of insight we make 5 Assumption 1. Nash equilibrium exists, is unique and is locally stable.
In particular, we assume that the function
Note that
L s   and an equilibrium is unique, then a differentiation of (11) establishes that ˆ/ N ds dN has the sign of
 is the own-price elasticity of demand and   An analogy exists with the well-known excess entry result in the theory of imperfectly competitive markets, as developed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and others. There the private incentive is to account for own price effects by producing too little. Foreseeing this, firms enter in anticipation of high profits. In our case, the situation is quite the reverse. The private incentive is to ignore external disease effects by stocking too densely. In anticipation of low profits due to disease, too few farms enter production.
Finally we turn to assessing how closing off the herd, or decreasing the value of  , will impact equilibrium. The stage 2, or stocking rate, effect is established through differentiating
with respect to ˆN s and  given the value of N set in stage 1. This allows us to identify the stage 2 response, or reaction function sensitivity, as
So a necessary and sufficient condition for
Proposition 2: Given Assumption 1, the monotonicity assumptions and 1 ( ; ) 0 L s   , then the participation-conditioned stocking rate ˆN s increases (decreases) with a closing off of production
While the presence of the externality may encourage overstocking, the marginal effect of a more open system is to decrease stocking. The stage 1 effect is then obtained from differentiating free-entry condition ˆ0 N   with respect to N and  when recognizing the implications for ˆN s . In order to do so, use (3) to write the effect of a change in stocking rate only on farm profit under symmetric actions as
when evaluated at Nash equilibrium.
The total differential of firm profit with respect to participation and the disease openness parameter is
Here the middle expression acknowledges that stage 1 entrants recognize in Stackelberg fashion the stage 2 effects on stocking rate that take the number of entrants as given.
Expression (17) may be written as 
. 
It follows from (19) that / 0 dN d  and the number of entrants increases as the production system is closed off.
Proposition 3: Given Assumption 1, the monotonicity assumptions, 1 ( ; ) 0 L s   , and infinitely elastic demand, then the number of entrants increases as the production system is closed off.
Closing off farms to external disease increases profit directly, and so promotes entry. As laid out in Proposition 2, closure increases the stocking rate on each farm. By itself, this would indirectly decrease entry. The direct effect of closing out disease dominates. Thus, closing off the production system both increases stocking rate per farm and the number of farms in a region. In other words, the growth of animal production in response to clearing a region of an infectious disease occurs at both the extensive and intensive margins.
Model 2: Antibiotics, Capitalization and Scale Come as a Package
Antibiotics facilitate control in that their use reduces product heterogeneity. Control is important because automation requires consistency (Chandler 1992) . Machines cannot be readily adapted to the heterogeneities that nature allows, even among progeny. In what follows we adapt Hennessy's (2005) model of how animal heterogeneity affects processing efficiency to study how the antibiotics technology might impact the labor capital relation in animal production. There he studied the effect of animal heterogeneity on time allocated to food and worker safety on the packing line. Our present interest is with the effects that a uniformitypromoting technology, such as antibiotic treatments, have on capitalization in animal grow-out. 6 We characterize labor as being the more flexible resource in that humans can intervene to accommodate disease-induced irregularities when machines cannot. There are two animal types, A and B, in respective proportions  and 1   . The labor requirement for each animal is  hours regardless of type under a flexible technology, which we refer to as FLEX. This technology uses no capital. The hourly wage rate is w so that the cost per animal is If the animal being treated at any time is type A, which occurs with probability  , then the probability that the machine has to be adjusted is 1   . If the animal being treated is type B, which occurs with probability 1   , then the probability that the machine has to be adjusted is  by feed costs to accommodate this effect, and the result could be negative, in which case feed cost savings alone would justify technology adoption. This effect is not related to the industrialization phenomenon as we study it here. For the sake of focus, we ignore it. Now we consider optimal herd size s . Let unit capacity cost be ( ) s  , which is assumed to be U shaped. These costs pertain to environmental compliance, agency costs due to management control and input acquisition costs. It is quite plausible that scale economies are associated with capitalization, so we assume that ( ) s  is decreasing such that total unit costs,
Under technology homogeneity among a large number of farms and free entry, equilibrium scale involves minimizing average cost. If  and  are large enough then the production format is FLEX and the scale problem is that of choosing s to minimize ( ) s 
Model 3: Biosecurity and Scale
Biosecurity costs take many forms, including design and use of procedures, guarding against animal and other pathogen vectors, using quarantine and showering facilities, and vaccinating.
Most are likely to display declining costs per unit production capacity. For example, truck wash facilities will be mostly idle for a small production unit, an annual employee training endeavor may as easily accommodate five or ten attendees, and it may be possible to obtain additional feed from the same source without scaling up attribute tests.
We develop a model of how scale economies in biosecurity costs affect size of operation and use of biosecurity inputs. Hennessy, Roosen and Jensen (2005) study scale in a unit cost minimization model where each animal brings an independent and identically distributed disease risk while any diseased animal infects the entire feedlot. It is distinguished from the model to be presented in that (a) the biosecurity input's unit cost is scale neutral, (b) the independent, identical distribution feature creates a source of scale diseconomy rather than a source of scale economy, and (c) it is less articulated in characterizing the roles of biosecurity inputs.
Our model assumes that the animal output market is perfectly competitive and all producers are identical in the technology available to them. Let ( input. This means that ( ) J Q , which reflects how biosecurity unit costs change with scale, is decreasing. Costs other than the biosecurity input amount to ( ) C Q , which can be viewed as the standard minimized cost of farming Q animals and ( ) ( ) / C Q C Q Q  is the unit cost for these non-biosecurity inputs.
As in Model 2, equilibrium scale is that which minimizes unit costs. 
The optimizing choices are written as * z and * Q . Second-order conditions are developed in the appendix and convexity is assumed. It is noteworthy that
This means that an increase in the biosecurity input makes average cost less sensitive to scale.
The decisions are technical complements in that more of z tends to make an increment of scale more beneficial in reducing average cost.
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Effect of Subsidy or Biosecurity Innovation
Intuition would suggest that the optimal choice of biosecurity input level should increase with a decrease in the input's price while the effect on scale of production is less clear. In the appendix we show that either of (i) a biosecurity input subsidy or (ii) an improvement in the biosecurity input production technology that leads to a reduction in its market price, have ambiguous effects on input use and production scale. We conclude that our model provides some support for the idea that a producer who is more confident that an exogenous biosecurity risk to productivity will not materialize is more likely to increase (a) own-farm biosecurity and also (b) scale of operation. Point (a) suggests that public animal health inputs may not crowd out their privately provided counterparts while point (b) posits a role public policy may unwittingly play in the industrialization process.
14 Such firm-level complementarities have long been studied in more general contexts, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990a) . What is most interesting in our model is that the responses can be mutually reenforcing across farms in a region. Parameter v may represent a summary statistic of biosecurity activities by other farms in the region. Then the ( ) 0 R   condition ensures that the best strategic response of a given farm to higher external protection is to increase on-farm protection, and a virtuous circle plays out. The game is one of strategic complementarities (i.e., between firms), as studied in Milgrom and Roberts (1990b) . In general, there is no guarantee that any equilibrium is unique (Echenique 2007) .
Conclusion
The path from pastoral agriculture toward industrial format animal farming has not been smooth. It has been faster for some farmed species, where avian produce acquiesced more quickly than hogs. Ruminants in general are still grown pastorally for at least some of their lives. Nonetheless, from a distance the rough-stroke outline of the paths taken have been quite similar where prominence must be assigned to technologies that control how inputs perform so that capital can operate efficiently. Animal health inputs must rank high among technologies that control input attributes as mortality, morbidity and cross-infection can disrupt throughput and lead to complete shutdowns for extended periods. However the quintessential control input is genetic composition for it allows the nature of primary input to be rendered homogeneous, so that only environmental considerations remain.
This chapter has sought to characterize aspects of how animal health inputs fit with production format. The interactions involved are many and varied, so, rather than trying to dine with a Swiss Army knife, we tailor three separate models. Model 1 shows that the reference view of infectious disease as a form of commons problem involving excess stocking is incomplete. The disease also induces socially suboptimal entry. Consequently, disease management innovations such as fencing commonage and regulating livestock marts are likely to have intricate consequences for productivity and welfare. Although admittedly very simplistic, this model warrants further scrutiny.
Model 2 looks inside the farm by focusing on an innovation that mitigates disease externalities. In particular, we emphasize the role that antibiotics play as a means of reducing the irregularities that inhibit capital substitution for labor. We show how antibiotics enable capitalization to substitute for labor. We also show how antibiotics can come as part of a complementary package involving capital inputs, to be adopted entirely or not at all, when the extent of non-uniformities that antibiotics can mitigate is large. In this sense the removal of antibiotics could reduce the incentive to capitalize in high-wage countries. Innovations in genetic control, however, make this possibility less likely, at least under our model assumptions.
One final comment on the model is that, in light of scale economies in physical asset investments, an external shock in technology or wage levels can see a fundamental transformation in production paradigm to the industrial format.
The third model is motivated by the observation that biosecurity investments are likely to exhibit scale economies so that scale and biosecurity investments are likely technical complements. We show that a decline in the unit cost of a biosecurity investment can reduce optimal scale. This is because one motive for increasing scale in the presence of biosecurity investments is to take best advantage of scale economies and this incentive weakens when the biosecurity investment becomes less costly. So while intuition might suggest that any subsidy or innovation in technologies associated with capital-intensive production will ensure more of it, we beg to differ. The model is also used to argue that public investments in securing a region from infectious disease can complement both scale and internal biosecurity investments. If this is the case, then an external shock could generate mutually reinforcing beneficial effects rippling through a decentralized production system. The sorts of shocks at issue could include efforts to improve technical proficiency or to reduce government corruption in the provision of public sector veterinary health services.
Stepping back to survey the recent evolution of animal production, we readily acknowledge a variety of shortcomings in our general framework. The approach is entirely production-driven, without reference to environmental bads or demands for goods other than cheap animal produce. It ignores the role of feedstuffs. Cheap in situ forage complements low-input pastoral
systems that are open to disease, and health inputs in such systems might be best embodied in hardy genetics rather than drugs or thick perimeter walls.
Finally, a tale of structural dynamics may have been missed when pointing to technology spillovers as the source of technological change. Once an industrial format takes root, much subsequent innovation is endogenous. After all, innovations translated from manufacturing processes have typically dealt with non-biological subjects while those from human medicine pertain to a very different market environment. Looking forward, the sector's horizon is overcast with environmental, animal welfare, zoonotic disease and other concerns that affect the sector in unique ways. Reservoirs of capacity for endogenous innovation will be required if animal production is to succeed in adapting.
biosecurity and also encourages a scaling up of production activities. With better external biosecurity, the animal production format is more likely to become industrial than backyard.
Finding the optimum in the explicit solution: Pose the problem as having two stages: 
